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The Impact of Adverse Inferences in Administrative
Hearings
Judge John M. Priester*
"Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character," Justice
Brandeis observed over seventy-five years ago.' How and when this
most persuasive evidence may be utilized by a fact finder is an issue that
has been ever evolving.
The right to remain silent in criminal prosecutions is absolute. In
civil and administrative hearings there is no such protection. Actually,
almost the opposite is the case. If a party fails to testify at a hearing, the
fact finder is allowed to draw an adverse inference from the silence. As
administrative hearings become more quasi-criminal in nature, it may be
an appropriate time to rethink the rationale behind allowing adverse inferences in administrative hearings.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The United States Constitution provides citizens the right to remain
silent. "No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ... ."' This constitutional protection was held
to be applicable to not only the federal government, but also the states,
in 1964.'
The protection afforded by this constitutional guarantee has been
widely ridiculed and taints anyone invoking the protection. The Supreme Court noted in 1956 that "[t]oo many, even those who should be
better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers." 4
Most grade school children can recite the protections associated with
the right to remain silent afforded a suspect upon his arrest from watching hours of police television shows. A child can tell you that a suspect
* Administrative Law Judge with the Division of Administrative Hearings, Iowa Department
of Inspections and Appeals, June 1997 to present. Assistant Public Defender, 1991 to 1997.
1. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

3. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
4. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
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has the right to remain silent and anything that the arrestee says can later
be used against him in a court of law.5
The constitutional protection cloaks the criminal defendant not only
at the time of arrest, but throughout the entire criminal proceeding. The
Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of a defendant's Fifth
Amendment right to tell a jury that a defendant's failure to testify supports an unfavorable inference against him.6 Trial courts are also forbidden from instructing juries that they are to view a defendant's silence
as evidence of guilt.7
If it is well-settled law that the Fifth Amendment protections cover a
suspect throughout the entire criminal proceeding, how much protection
does the Fifth Amendment afford that same defendant if he is sued in a
civil matter, or facing penalties in a state administrative hearing?
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

The question of whether to extend the application of the Fifth
Amendment to civil, along with criminal, hearings was addressed by the
Supreme Court in 1924. The Court stated:
The Government insists, broadly, that the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in any
civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the
nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is
sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and
criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to
8
subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it.
The constitutional protection against self-incrimination has also been
recognized in administrative hearings. 9 While the Fifth Amendment
protections are available to a party in both civil and administrative hearings, the cost associated with asserting this privilege can be very great.
Just what is an "adverse inference"? When one refuses to testify in a
hearing, an inference of guilt "may be drawn as a matter of law from the
invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a civil suit. ' '1 ° The Iowa Supreme
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
6. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
7.Id.at 614.
8. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
9. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
10. State v. Postorino, 193 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Wis. 1972) (citing Grognet v. Fox Valley Trucking
Serv., 172 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Wis. 1969)).
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Court defined this inference further, stating that "a trial court may infer
in a civil case from a party's refusal to answer based on a claim of privilege against self-incrimination that the answer would be adverse to the
party."'" An inference of guilt can cloak a party in a civil matter who
refuses to testify. Such pitfalls face a party in an administrative hearing.
In Baxter v. Palmigiano,'2 the Supreme Court faced the question of
applying adverse inferences in prison discipline settings. Prisoners in
the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institution were instructed at the
commencement of disciplinary hearings that they were not required to
testify at the disciplinary hearings and could remain silent, but that the
silence could be used against them.' 3 The Court held that since no
criminal proceedings were pending against the inmate at the time of the
disciplinary hearing, and the inmate was informed that his silence could
be used against him, "permitting an adverse inference to be drawn from
an inmate's silence at his disciplinary proceedings is not, on its face, an
invalid practice."14
When making the ultimate determination in a case, the fact-finder
may not rely solely upon an adverse inference. The Supreme Court
noted in Baxter that "an inmate's silence in and of itself is insufficient to
support an adverse decision by the Disciplinary Board."1 5 An adverse
inference "may be drawn only if there is other evidence supporting an
adverse finding; it must not alone constitute the evidence of guilt."' 6
The ability to draw an adverse inference from a party's silence is
codified in Iowa law. The Iowa Code, in the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act, states that if "a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to answer on the ground that the testimony may be self incriminating, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from the refusal."17
The Code, in the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
chapter, also provides that if "a party called to testify refuses to answer
on the ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the court
may draw an adverse inference from the refusal." 18 The Iowa Supreme
Court has recognized this legal principle. 19
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Eldridge v. Herman, 291 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Iowa 1980).
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
Id at 316.
Id at 320.
Id. at 317.
State v. Merlino, 524 A.2d 821, 825-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).

17. IOWA CODE ANN. § 252K.316(7) (West 2002).
18. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598B.310(3) (West 2002).

19. Craig Foster Ford, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 562 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Iowa 1997).
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS WITH CRIMINAL RAMIFICATIONS

In light of the heavy cost associated with invoking the Fifth Amendment right to silence, is it appropriate to require a party in a state administrative hearing to face the Solomonic struggle between testifying in a
hearing and possibly incriminating oneself or remaining silent and facing the adverse inference? An adverse inference should not be drawn if
the penalty imposed at the conclusion of the proceeding is so severe as
20
to effectively destroy the privilege.
Professionals licensed by the State face disciplinary actions in administrative hearings. 21 Many of these hearings are quasi-criminal in nature.
While not facing imprisonment, professionals can be sanctioned with
fines that are labeled "administrative penalties," and can lose their ability to practice their livelihood.2 2
An example of an administrative hearing with severe consequences
would be a physician who is faced with losing his medical license for
having a sexual relationship with a patient. A sexual relationship between a physician and a patient is considered sexual abuse in Iowa.2 3
Such action would also be a violation of the physician's duty, and could
24
result in the revocation of the physician's license to practice medicine.
After the sexual relationship is brought to light the physician may be
arrested. Upon his arrest and throughout the criminal case the physician
may remain silent and neither the prosecuting authority nor the judge
may comment upon the silence.
When the physician comes for a disciplinary hearing before the Iowa
Board of Medical Examiners, the physician must make a difficult decision. The physician may want to testify to explain the relationship and
attempt to mitigate the consequences upon his license to practice medicine. However, whatever he testifies to could then be used against him
criminally. The physician would likely invoke the Fifth Amendment
and remain silent. This would be prudent advice especially, if the criminal matter is not concluded or is pending on appeal. However, the
Board of Medical Examiners may draw an adverse inference from the
silence and, if there is sufficient other evidence, revoke the physician's
license to practice medicine. In this instance, the consequence of the
adverse inference would be so severe as to destroy the privilege.
20. Leonetti, 524 A.2d at 826.
21. See IOWA CODE ANN. § § 17A, 272C (West 2002).
22. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 272C.3 (West 2002).
23. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.15 (West 2002).
24. IOWA CODE ANN. § 148.6(2)(b) (West 2002).
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There are other examples where the invocation of the right to remain
silent would have an impact, but not as severe as in the previous example. Implied consent driver's license suspension cases are situations
where criminal ramifications may flow from the administrative hearing.
When a driver is stopped for driving while intoxicated, a criminal
charge is filed by the local county attorney, and an administrative action
is commenced by the Iowa Department of Transportation. Usually the
administrative hearing will take place before the criminal case is reAt the administrative hearing, the driver also faces the disolved."
lemma of whether to testify on his behalf to avoid losing his license or
remain silent to avoid exposing himself to criminal liability.
One important distinction between the philandering physician and the
drunk driver is the burden of proof. The State of Iowa has the burden to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the physician violated
26
his duty and should therefore lose his license to practice medicine.
The drunk driver has the burden of proof to establish at the administrative hearing that he was driving properly.27
Thus, when attempting to draw distinctions in administrative hearings
as to when adverse inferences would be appropriate a fact finder may do
well to first address the burden of proof. If the appellant has the burden
of proof and fails to testify, this would be a situation where the drawing
of an adverse inference would be appropriate.
The second aspect to look at would be the consequences facing the
appellant. If the sanction is so great, such as the loss of a livelihood or
the imposition of an administrative penalty that closely resembles a punitive fine, the fact finder would do better to hesitate before drawing the
adverse inference. The fact finder should keep in mind that the drawing
28
of an adverse inference is always permitted, but is not mandatory.
CONCLUSION

There are many situations in administrative hearings where the drawing of adverse inferences is appropriate. A fact-finder should balance
factors such as: which party has the burden of proof, the penalty to be
imposed administratively and the amount of evidence in the record
25. Iowa law requires the administrative hearing to take place within forty-five days of the
notice of appeal. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321J. 13(2) (West 2002).
26. Eaves v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 467 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1991).
27. Mary v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 382 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §
17A. 18(3) (West 2002).
28. Recommendation for Discharge of Kelvie, 384 N.W.2d 901, 906 (Minn. App. 1986).
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without the adverse inference. In situations where the penalty to be imposed is of high consequence (such as the loss of a license to practice in
a profession or the imposition of an administrative penalty that more resembles a punitive fine), the best route for the fact finder is one of caution. Since drawing an adverse inference is permissive and reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, to err on the side of not drawing
an adverse inference is the best course.
While silence is evidence of the most persuasive character, an adverse
inference need not be drawn from the silence in an administrative hearing. Many reasons may exist for invoking the Fifth Amendment right to
silence. To shelter wrongdoers should not be the immediate conclusion
drawn by the fact finder. If the only evidence against a party is that
party's silence, it is an inappropriate exercise of discretion to draw an
adverse inference.
Caution may be the better part of constitutional valor when weighing
the appellant's constitutional rights against the imposition of an adverse
inference.

